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adults were given trials in which they decided whether a property
knowntobepossessedbymembersofonecategorywasalsopossessed
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ing showed a curvilinear development,with causal choices beingmost
frequent for 8-year-olds regardless of context. Causal inductions
decreased thereafter because 12-year-olds and adultsmademore tax-
onomic choiceswhen reasoning in the taxonomic context. These ﬁnd-
ings suggest that simple causal relations may often be the default
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sitivity to causal direction is present early on, and that children over-
generalize their causal knowledge when reasoning.
 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open
access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by/3.0/).Introduction
Children make category-based inductions when they infer properties and features in novel catego-
ries based on what they know to be true about familiar related categories (for reviews, see chapters in
A.K. Bright, A. Feeney / Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 122 (2014) 48–61 49Feeney & Heit, 2007, and Hayes, Heit, & Swendson, 2010). Many different types of relations between
categories can support such inferences. For example, the fact that tigers have a property or that ante-
lopes have a property may be equally good evidence that lions have the property. The ﬁrst inference
might be strong because lions and tigers are taxonomically related, whereas the second may be strong
because lions eat antelopes and this food chain relation provides a plausible causal mechanism for
property transmission. This example is consistent with claims based on structured Bayesian ap-
proaches to inductive reasoning (see Kemp & Tenenbaum, 2009) that our knowledge about the rela-
tions that hold between categories of objects can be structured in a variety of ways. One of our aims in
this study was to examine whether causal or taxonomic relations are more privileged in young chil-
dren’s category-based inductive reasoning. It was unclear which knowledge structure might serve as
the default because some researchers suggest that taxonomic reasoning is a default strategy (e.g.,
Kemp & Tenenbaum, 2009; Shafto & Coley, 2003), whereas others emphasize the primacy of causal
knowledge (e.g., Rehder, 2006; Rehder, 2009).
Because they are inductive, category-based inferences are probabilistic, but they effectively reduce
uncertainty about the world. Understanding the constraints placed on inductive inferences by the
underlying structure of different knowledge sources is crucial if we want to understand the processes
that allow inductive inferences to be ﬂexible yet effective. Several recent studies (Kemp & Tenenbaum,
2009; Shafto, Kemp, Bonawitz, Coley, & Tenenbaum, 2008) show that adults’ inferences are especially
sensitive to knowledge about how causal relations are structured. However, little is known about
whether children and adults use causal knowledge in similar ways to support their inductive infer-
ences. Our second aim of this study was to examine whether, like adults (see Rehder, 2009; Shafto,
Coley, & Baldwin, 2007; Shafto, Coley, & Vitkin, 2007; Shafto et al., 2008), children are sensitive to
the direction of the causal relation that holds between categories. Thus, in addition to examining when
children’s inductive inference becomes sensitive to causal relations, we examined how sophisticated
children are in their use of such knowledge for reasoning.
Causal knowledge in inductive reasoning
The effects of causal knowledge on reasoning are not very well captured by older models of cate-
gory-based induction that emphasize featural similarity (Sloman, 1993) and/or class membership
(Osherson, Smith, Wilkie, Lopez, & Shaﬁr, 1990). Such similarity-based models are powerful at
accounting for patterns of inductive reasoning about taxonomic properties (i.e., properties such as
genes whose distribution in the population may depend on taxonomic relations) and about blank
properties (i.e., properties that participants possess no knowledge about). However, they fail to cap-
ture induction across a broader variety of properties and in expert populations (see Medin, Coley,
Storms, & Hayes, 2003; Rehder & Hastie, 2001; Shafto & Coley, 2003), especially when there is a causal
explanation for the occurrence of shared properties (Rehder, 2006).
Causal knowledge plays a vital role in cognition from infancy onward (Sobel & Kirkham, 2007). The
ability to understand causal structures provides children with tools that help them to successfully pre-
dict future events and understand the outcome of active intervention, allowing them to gain increas-
ing control over their environment (Gopnik et al., 2004). By 4 years of age, children are capable of
understanding simple causal mechanisms across the domains of biology (Wellman, Hickling, & Schult,
1997) and psychology (Flavell, Green, & Flavell, 1995) as well as causal explanations in social and
physical domains (Hickling &Wellman, 2001). Similarly, children use causal knowledge to classify ob-
jects (Ahn, Gelman, Amsterlaw, Hohenstein, & Kalish, 2000) and natural kinds (Meunier & Cordier,
2009).
The fact that children make use of causal information across diverse domains and tasks under-
scores its potential importance in children’s category-based reasoning. Indeed, evidence suggests that
children can use causal knowledge when making inductive inferences. For example, Hayes and
Thompson (2007) taught children (5- and 8-year-olds) and adults about features of two artiﬁcial base
creatures, followed by a target that was more similar to one base but shared a causal antecedent with
the other base. Results indicated that when the causal link was explicit, all age groups preferred to
make causal rather than similarity-based inductions. That is, they preferred to project a property to
the target from the causally related base creature than from the more similar base creature. When
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related items, unlike the older children and adults who made predominantly causal choices. Similarly,
Opfer and Bulloch (2007) demonstrated that 5-year-olds were capable of ignoring perceptual similar-
ity in favor of relational similarity when the latter had a causal antecedent but not when it was
non-causal. Both of these studies suggest that children’s category-based inductive reasoning may be
affected by knowledge about causal relations, although they do not allow us to conclude that causal
knowledge structures are the default. Moreover, such studies do not address the extent to which chil-
dren’s inductive reasoning is sensitive to the underlying structure of causal knowledge (e.g. Pearl,
2000; Sloman, 2005). Consequently, we cannot know whether children’s use of causal knowledge in
induction is mediated by the same underlying processes as in adults.Structure of causal knowledge: Causal asymmetry effects
An important feature of causal knowledge is that it is directional, with causes always preceding or
at least co-occurring with their effects (Waldmann, 2000). There is evidence that adults take such
structural features into account because their causal reasoning tends to display distinctive asymmetry
effects (Fenker, Waldmann, & Holyoak, 2005; Fernbach, Darlow, & Sloman, 2011; Sloman, 2005). Rea-
soning in line with how we experience cause–effect relations (predictive causal reasoning) appears to
be less effortful than reasoning backward (diagnostic causal reasoning), suggesting that computational
complexity is a key determinant of the causal asymmetry effect (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). For
example, when people are asked to verify whether two words are causally related, they respond faster
when the words are presented in a predictive order compared with a diagnostic order (Fenker et al.,
2005).
Causal direction also affects inductive inferences. Thus, people ﬁnd category-based inductive argu-
ments more convincing when reasoning in a predictive direction from cause to effect than when rea-
soning diagnostically from effect to cause (Medin et al., 2003; Shafto et al., 2008). To illustrate, people
are more conﬁdent in the conclusion that bees have an unknown property given that it is present in
the premise category ﬂowers than when the roles of the two categories are reversed. People’s judg-
ments appear to accord well with the causal asymmetry effects that are predicted by formal models
of causal-based property generalization (Rehder, 2009; Shafto et al., 2008), although there are argu-
ments that, relative to a normative standard, people have too much conﬁdence in arguments with a
predictive structure (Fernbach et al., 2011). Despite the convincing evidence that the causal asymme-
try effect is a robust phenomenon in adults’ category-based reasoning, and evidence that children’s
predictive reasoning about novel mechanical systems is better than their diagnostic reasoning (see
Bindra, Clarke, & Shultz, 1980; Hong, Chijun, Xuemei, Shan, & Chongde, 2005), it is unknown whether
children display similar asymmetry effects when they use causal knowledge to support their inductive
inferences. Our study was designed to answer this question.Context-sensitive reasoning
Although it is clear that causal knowledge is important in induction, adults are adept at tailoring
their inferences to the particular reasoning context. Consider the example with which we opened this
article. If we ask a participant to decide whether lions have a certain gene on the basis that tigers have
that gene, then the taxonomic relation that holds between lions and tigers is relevant. On the other
hand, if we ask whether lions have a disease on the basis that antelopes have that disease, then the
causal mechanism for disease transmission from antelope to lions via predation is relevant. There is
much evidence that adults, and sometimes children, can show inductive selectivity by selecting the
appropriate knowledge with which to evaluate category-based inductive arguments. For example,
Heit and Rubinstein (1994) showed that people make stronger inferences about shared properties
when the nature of the property is in accord with the nature of the relationship between two catego-
ries. According to Shafto, Coley, and Baldwin (2007); Shafto, Coley, and Vitkin (2007), changes in con-
text affect the acute availability of different knowledge structures. Thus, when reasoning about
properties such as diseases, people are more inclined to use knowledge about causal or ecological
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properties.
There is some evidence that children are also sensitive to the nature of the property that they are
reasoning about (for a full review, see Hayes, 2006). Nguyen and Murphy (2003), for example, showed
that by 7 years of age, children reason taxonomically about biochemical features but use thematic
relations to guide inferences about situational properties. However, in their study younger children’s
use of different relations was heavily inﬂuenced by task format, making it difﬁcult to evaluate the de-
gree to which these children were using different knowledge structures in a systematic manner. Coley
(2012) demonstrated that there are environmental inﬂuences on the age by which children show
inductive selectivity; by 10 years of age, children raised in urban environments selectively project dis-
ease properties between categories that are ecologically related and so suggest a causal mechanism for
disease transmission, whereas rural children show the same pattern as early as 6 years of age. In an
open-ended category generation task, Vitkin, Coley, and Hu (2005) also showed that children’s infer-
ences are constrained by the nature of the property that they are asked to reason about. Thus, when
told that the two categories share ‘‘stuff inside,’’ children generated categories based on similarity,
whereas they gave interaction-based responses when reasoning about shared diseases.
In this study we manipulated the nature of the property that participants were asked to reason
about. Although we expected adults to show property effects, our aim in this study was not to assess
the age by which children demonstrate inductive selectivity because any answer to this question will
depend on the paradigm employed. Indeed, inductive selectivity effects have been demonstrated in
young children (Heyman & Gelman, 2000a; Heyman & Gelman, 2000b) and even infants (see Mandler
& McDonough, 1998; Rakison & Hahn, 2004). Instead, we wanted to examine, in the domain of folk
biology, how children reason before selectivity emerges and whether a particular knowledge structure
is more important.
On the basis of the literature, it is very difﬁcult to answer questions about default knowledge struc-
tures. There appears to be reason for assuming that taxonomic knowledge structures are the default;
for example, using a speeded response paradigm, Shafto and colleagues (2007) showed that access to
knowledge about causal mechanisms for disease transmission due to ecological relations between cat-
egories is restricted when adults are asked to respond quickly, whereas taxonomic knowledge seems
unaffected by response timemanipulations. This ﬁnding, that taxonomic knowledge is primary, is con-
sistent with suggestions that taxonomic knowledge structures are the default (Kemp & Tenenbaum,
2009). However, there is also reason to believe that taxonomic knowledge structures are not the de-
fault; Rehder (2006), Rehder (2009) emphasized the primacy of causal knowledge over taxonomic
knowledge, and there is evidence that young children prefer to use thematic knowledge rather than
taxonomic knowledge when reasoning about categories (see Greenﬁeld & Scott, 1986; Nguyen &
Murphy, 2003; Smiley & Brown, 1979).
Because the developmental literature is divided on the question of how young children reason
inductively, there are also important theoretical questions about the development of inductive reason-
ing to which questions of default knowledge are relevant. Sloutsky (2010) theorized that inductive
selectivity depends on a maturationally late learning system. Sloutsky suggested that, prior to the
emergence of inductive selectivity, children rely on knowledge acquired through a simple learning
system that exploits co-occurrences and similarity. He cited evidence that before 7 years of age chil-
dren rely largely on such similarity between base and target category to guide their inferences (Fisher
& Sloutsky, 2005; Rakison & Lupyan, 2008; Sloutsky & Fisher, 2004). This would suggest that prior to
the emergence of inductive selectivity, children ought to rely heavily on superﬁcial similarity or cat-
egory membership rather than on causal knowledge. However, there is evidence that even children as
young as 5 years can ignore featural similarity when explicit causal knowledge is available (Hayes &
Thompson, 2007; Opfer & Bulloch, 2007).
Here we examined whether children as young as 5 years prefer to reason on the basis of taxonomic
or causal relations. This group was younger than the youngest participants that Coley (2012) found to
display inductive selectivity. The contradictory ﬁndings in the literature made it hard to predict
whether these children will prefer arguments with taxonomic or causal relations and whether they
will be sensitive to causal structure. If young children’s inductive inferences are dominated by taxo-
nomic relations, then we would except to see few effects of causal knowledge. If, on the other hand,
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young children will exhibit causal asymmetry effects.Method
Participants
In total, 44 Year 1 primary school children (Mage = 5.4 years), 40 Year 4 primary school children
(Mage = 8.4 years), 54 Year 8 secondary school children (Mage = 12.6 years), and a control group of 26
adults from Durham University (Mage = 24.6 years) in the United Kingdom took part in the experiment.
Year 1 and Year 4 students were recruited from a suburban state primary school in the North East of
England. Year 8 students were recruited from a suburban state secondary school in the same geo-
graphical area. There were approximately equal numbers of male and female participants in the var-
ious age groups.
Design
The experiment had a 4 (Age Group: 5-year-olds, 8-year-olds, 12-year-olds, or adults)  2 (Prop-
erty: disease or cells)  2 (Direction: predictive or diagnostic)  2 (List: A or B) mixed design, with re-
peated measures on the direction variable only.
Materials
Participants reasoned about 12 trials, each consisting of a triad of categories: a base and two tar-
gets. On each trial, participants were presented with a base category, were told that it possessed a fea-
ture, and were asked which of the target categories they thought was most likely to share that feature.
One of the targets was causally related to the base in the form of a food chain relation. This causally
related target category always belonged to a different superordinate category from the base. The other
target category was taxonomically related to the base category and was from the same superordinate
category as the base. In the predictive condition, the causal direction was ecologically consistent. For
example, the base category might be a banana and the causally related target might be a monkey. In
the diagnostic version of this example, the directionality of the causal link was reversed so that the
monkey served as the base and the banana served as the target. To ensure that children understood
the causal mechanisms by which two categories might be connected, the nature of the causal relation-
ship was limited to transparent food chains. An example with pictures, all of which were selected from
Rossion and Pourtois (2004) database, is shown in Fig. 1.
The direction of the causal link was counterbalanced across items. For List A, the causal direction
was predictive for Items 1 to 6 and was diagnostic for Items 7 to 12; for List B, the opposite was the
case. Thus, although direction was a within-participants factor, participants never saw any of the cau-
sal pairs twice. The task was self-paced and run on a laptop using purpose-built software.
So that the causally related pairs could be presented in either a predictive direction (e.g., car-
rot? horse) or a diagnostic direction (e.g., horse? carrot), different categories served as the base
(e.g., carrot or horse). Because the taxonomically related target category belonged to the same super-
ordinate category as the base category, this meant that the taxonomically related target category was
different on diagnostic and predictive trials. Thus, it was crucial to equate the similarity between the
base instance and the taxonomic alternative targets across predictive conditions (e.g., carrot? onion)
and diagnostic conditions (e.g., horse? sheep).
A group of 18 Durham University students rated the similarity on a scale from 1 (not at all similar)
to 9 (highly similar) between pairs of categories presented verbally in a pretest. Only triads in which
the similarity ratings were approximately equal across both conditions were selected (all paired-sam-
ple t tests had ps > .05), resulting in 12 triads. Mean similarity ratings by triad are presented in Appen-
dix Table A1). Although we did not collect similarity ratings from children, there is evidence that
children and adults perceive similarity relations in similar ways. For example, using materials
Fig. 1. (A) Triad with predictive causal link. (B) Triad with diagnostic causal link.
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Smith (1992) showed effects of similarity on reasoning in 5-year-olds that were identical to the sim-
ilarity effects originally found in adults by Osherson and colleagues.
The strength of the causal relation between the base and target categories was examined in a sep-
arate pretest on 19 Durham University students who rated the extent to which properties might be
transmitted between the base and both target categories in each triad on a scale from 1 (not at all)
to 9 (a great deal). In all cases, ratings were stronger for causally related categories than for taxonom-
ically related categories. These differences were statistically signiﬁcant (p < .05) in 9 of 12 cases and
were marginally signiﬁcant in the remaining 3 cases (see Appendix Table A2 for ratings).
Procedure
Parents received written information about the study with an opt-out form in case they did not
want their children to take part. Children gave their assent at the beginning of the session.
Participants were randomly allocated to either the cell or disease condition. The task was explained
verbally, and written instructions were presented on-screen. Participants completed 2 practice trials
before commencing the main task. They saw a base picture at the top of the screen and were told that
the animal, plant, or object had an unfamiliar disease or special cells (e.g., ‘‘This horse has a disease
called talio/has talio cells inside’’). A different artiﬁcial cell or disease name was used for each trial.
The base picture was followed by two arrows pointing to two target pictures. Participants decided
which of the two pictures was more likely to share the disease or special cells with the base category.
The location of the causally and taxonomically related targets on the screen was randomized. Partic-
ipants pressed 1 if they thought that the left-hand picture was more likely to share the property and
pressed 9 if they chose the right-hand picture.
Results
For each individual, the proportion of causally related targets that were chosen was calculated for
the six predictive and six diagnostic triad items. These were analyzed using a 2 (Direction)  4 (Age
Group)  2 (Property)  2 (List) mixed-design analysis of variance (ANOVA) with direction as the only
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items rather than participants.
All effects involving the counterbalancing list variable were nonsigniﬁcant (all ps > .10), so there is
no further reference to this variable.
As predicted, there was a main effect of direction, Fs(1, 146) = 20.8, p < .0005, effect size f = .38,
Fi(1, 11) = 21.4, p = .001, and a signiﬁcant main effect of age group, Fs(1, 146) = 6.5, p < .0005, effect size
f = .37, Fi(1.9, 21.3) = 22.56 (Greenhouse–Geisser adjustment for non-sphericity), p < .0005. Partici-
pants made signiﬁcantly more causal inferences when the link between the causally related categories
was predictive (M = .60, SE = .026) than when it was diagnostic (M = .47, SE = .028). Despite the signif-
icant main effects, the interaction between age group and direction did not approach signiﬁcance,
Fs(2, 146) = 0.21, p = .89, effect size f = .006, Fi(3, 33) = 0.55, p = .66. Rather, as may be seen in Table 1,
children were as strongly inﬂuenced by the structure of causal knowledge as were adults.
Post hoc comparisons using Bonferroni adjustments on the means involved in the signiﬁcant effect
of age group showed that 8-year-olds made more causal choices than both 12-year-olds (p = .05) and
adults (p < .0005). There was no signiﬁcant difference in the proportion of causal choices made by 12-
year-olds and adults (p = .17), and 5-year-olds made signiﬁcantly more causal choices than adults
(p = .014). Both 5-year-olds, t(43) = 2.69, p = . 001, and 8-year-olds, t(39) = 3.91, p < .0005, made more
causal choices than predicted by chance alone.
The trend line in Fig. 2 suggests that causal induction shows a curvilinear development in the shape
of an inverted U, which was conﬁrmed with a polynomial contrast. This involves starting with the lin-
ear contrast and then sequentially carrying out higher power contrasts until the highest-powerTable 1
Mean proportions of causal inferences (and standard deviations) across age groups.
Causal direction
Predictive Diagnostic Total
Age group
5-year-olds .67 (.30) .51 (.32) .59 (.21)
8-year-olds .74 (.29) .60 (.37) .67 (.28)
12-year-olds .57 (.39) .46 (.37) .51 (.35)
Adults .42 (.40) .32 (.35) .37 (.35)
Total .62 (.36) .48 (.36) .55 (.32)
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
5-year-olds 8-year-olds 12-year-olds Adults
Cells
Disease
ns
**
ns
**
Fig. 2. Mean proportions of causal choices (and standard error bars) at different ages across two types of property. **p < .01.
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dratic term (p = .014). The cubic contrast was nonsigniﬁcant (p = .18). The quadratic effect across age
group was also highly signiﬁcant across items, Fi(1, 11) = 15.7, p < .0005. This pattern conﬁrms that the
use of causal knowledge in inductive reasoning follows a curvilinear developmental trajectory, peak-
ing at 8 years and decreasing thereafter.
The results of the ANOVA contained a signiﬁcant main effect of property, Fs(1, 146) = 8.6, p = .004,
effect size f = .24, Fi(1, 11) = 60.9, p < .0005. Causal choices were signiﬁcantly more frequent when par-
ticipants reasoned about diseases (M = .60, SE = .033) than when they reasoned about cells (M = .47,
SE = .033). However, this was qualiﬁed by a signiﬁcant interaction between property and age group,
Fs(2, 106) = 6.2, p = .001, effect size f = .36, Fi(3, 33) = 62.7, p < .0005. As Fig. 2 shows, both 4- and
8-year-olds made a similar number of causal inductions in both the cell and disease conditions
(ps > .25, effect size d < 0.2), suggesting that they are not exhibiting strong inductive selectivity effects.
In contrast, both adults (p = .031, effect size d = 0.8) and 12-year-olds (p = .0005, effect size d = 1.2)
showed strong inductive selectivity effects, making signiﬁcantly more causal inductions in the disease
condition than in the cell condition.
Furthermore, the proportion of causal choices was similar across all age groups when reasoning
about diseases (all pairwise comparison ps > .20). In contrast, when reasoning about cells, 4- and
8-year-olds made signiﬁcantly more causal choices than both 12-year-olds and adults (ps < .022).
The latter two age groups were not signiﬁcantly different from each other (p = .64). Thus, it appears
that the increased selectivity is driven by a developmental decrease in causal choices when reasoning
about cells rather than a change in the application of causal knowledge when reasoning about
diseases.
There was no signiﬁcant interaction between direction and property, Fs(1, 146) = 2.26, p = .13, ef-
fect size f = .12, Fi(1, 11) = 2.94, p = .11, and no three-way interaction among age group, property,
and direction, Fs(3, 146) = 0.93, p = .43, effect size f = .13, Fi(3, 33) = 0.89, p = .46.
Our results appear to show that children do not display inductive selectivity until 12 years of age
and that before that age they prefer to use causal knowledge when evaluating inferences. In addition,
children as young as 5 years are as sensitive to causal structure as are adults. To rule out alternative
accounts of children’s preference for causally related targets, we carried out a number of posttests.
One possibility is that the causally related category pairs were more strongly associated or co-occur
more frequently than the taxonomically related category pairs. This would then give the impression
that children were reasoning causally, whereas in fact the results would be explicable in terms of
co-occurrence and associations (Sloutsky & Fisher, 2008). Remember that in our pretests we ensured
that the different taxonomically related targets in the predictive and diagnostic conditions were
equally associated with the base category, but we did not check whether the degree of association be-
tween the base category and each of the targets was approximately equal. Associations between
words tend to be reﬂected in how we use language; words that co-occur more frequently are more
strongly associated in semantic memory (Spence & Owens, 1990). One way to guard against the pos-
sibility that our materials are confounded by associative strength is to look at the frequency of co-
occurrence between two words in a text or sentence (Church & Hanks, 1990; Ide & Veronis, 1998;
Rapp & Wettler, 1991). The World Wide Web provides an almost inﬁnite source of linguistic data.
Using a Google proximity search specifying that the categories must co-occur in any order within a
window of six consecutive words (Canas, 1990), we calculated the conditional co-occurrence of the
taxonomic and causal category pairs using the following formula suggested by Heylighen (2001):Aw1&w2 ¼ Pðw1jw2Þ ¼ Pðw1&w2ÞPðw1Þ ¼
Nðw1&w2Þ
Nðw1ÞIn this equation, P(w1 & w2) represents the probability that a text contains both words w1 and w2,
and P(w1) represents the probability that it contains w1 on its own. To calculate the conditional prob-
ability, one can simply count the number of timesw1 andw2 co-occur and divide this by the number of
times w1 occurs by chance in the same text sample. This is repeated for w2. We took the mean of the
two conditional probabilities for each pair and calculated z scores. Using an independent-samples t
test, we compared the mean co-occurrence index for the causally related category pairs (mean z
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(mean z score = 0.15, SD = 1.2). This showed that there was no signiﬁcant difference between the two
co-occurrence indexes, t = 1.68, df = 31.3 (adjusted for unequal variances), p = .10, effect size d = 0.5.
However, as indicated by the medium effect size, if anything the taxonomic category pairs co-occurred
slightly more frequently, strengthening our claim that children and adults were drawing on structured
causal knowledge rather than simple associative knowledge.
Another possible alternative explanation of our results is that the youngest participants preferred
causally related targets because they did not possess the knowledge about taxonomic relations re-
quired to recognize the strength of arguments based on such relations. To rule out this possibility,
we checked taxonomic and causal knowledge levels in a separate sample of the same age as our youn-
gest age group. A group of 20 5-year-olds were shown the color pictures of the category pairs used in
the main experiment and were asked about biological group membership (‘‘Do this [name of ﬁrst cat-
egory] and this [name of second category] belong to the same group?’’) and causal relatedness (‘‘Does
this [name of ﬁrst category] eat this [name of second category]?’’). Paired-samples t tests across the 20
children and by items showed that there was no difference between the causal relatedness endorse-
ment proportion (M = .78, SD = .13) and the biological group membership endorsement proportion
(M = .79, SD = .17), ts(19) = 0.68, p = .51, effect size d = 0.15, ti(11) = 0.037, p = .97. Thus, it is unlikely
that the 5- and 8-year-olds in the main experiment preferred causal targets because, relative to their
causal knowledge, they lacked taxonomic knowledge.Discussion
We had two aims in carrying out this study. First, we wanted to examine whether causal or taxo-
nomic knowledge is the default prior to the age at which children develop inductive selectivity. Sec-
ond, we wanted to see whether children are sensitive to aspects of causal structure when evaluating
category-based inductive arguments. In showing that 5- and 8-year-old participants preferred argu-
ments that were strong because of a causal mechanism for transmission via a predation relation even
when the property reasoned about was a cell, our ﬁndings suggest that causal knowledge structures
are the default in children’s reasoning prior to the emergence of inductive selectivity. In addition,
5-year-olds are just as sensitive to causal direction as are adults. In fact, all age groups in our exper-
iment endorsed signiﬁcantly more predictive arguments than diagnostic arguments. Interestingly,
causal reasoning seems to show a curvilinear development, peaking at 8 years of age and decreasing
thereafter due to the emergence of inductive selectivity. Although we did not anticipate this last ﬁnd-
ing, as we show below, it has parallels in the literature on children’s understanding of folk biology.
The pattern of results we observed has very interesting implications for theories about how induc-
tive reasoning develops. Sloutsky (2010) suggested that ‘‘adult-like’’ inductive reasoning depends on a
maturationally late learning system. This suggestion can explain why we did not observe inductive
selectivity until the age of 12 years, driven by an increase in taxonomic inferences when reasoning
about cells. Under Sloutsky’s account, reasoning about cells might require more abstract conceptual
knowledge about mechanisms that are not perceptually observable such as genetics and inheritance.
However, this account also seems to suggest that prior to the emergence of inductive selectivity chil-
dren ought to rely heavily on superﬁcial similarity or category membership rather than on causal
knowledge. Our data suggest otherwise, with 5- and 8-year-olds making the most causal inductions
regardless of context. Alongside recent evidence from Hayes and Lim (2013), who showed that induc-
tive selectivity even in relatively transparent contexts depends on conscious awareness of the rele-
vance of contextual clues, the current ﬁndings cast doubt on the claim that early category-based
induction is driven exclusively by simple learning mechanisms based on co-occurrence and perceptual
similarity. At the very least, it requires a substantial downward revision of the age at which conceptual
knowledge such as simple causal structures can support category-based inductive reasoning.
In addition to their tendency to prefer causal relations rather than taxonomic relations as the basis
for inference, 5- and 8-year-old participants, like older participants, made more causal inferences
when the causal relation between the categories was predictive than when it was diagnostic. The
inﬂuence of different kinds of knowledge seems to be fundamentally related to the way in which this
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does not have a homogeneous structure and can vary in complexity from direct cause–effect links to
more complex common cause relations (Sloman, 2005), one might expect the abstract organization of
knowledge about food chains involving simple causal transmission to be similar in adults and chil-
dren. For example, children as young as 3 years show an understanding of the importance of causal
order in which effects follow or co-occur with their causes (Bullock & Gelman, 1979; Bullock, Gelman,
& Baillargeon, 1982). Reasoning about relations that are in line with this ordering of events might be
cognitively simpler than needing to reason about possible causes given an outcome (Kahneman &
Tversky, 1973). Shafto and colleagues (2008) suggested that causal asymmetry effects are driven by
a multilevel understanding of causal knowledge—concrete knowledge about the existence of causal
relations and more conceptual knowledge about how and when causal relations are most likely to
warrant an inference from one agent to another.
The simple causal structure used in the current task might explain why some of our ﬁndings are
different from previous results. For example, whereas the current study showed no age-related
changes in the frequency of causal reasoning about diseases, work on ecological reasoning by Coley,
Vitkin, Seaton, and Yopchick (2005) demonstrates a clear developmental trend in the use of non-tax-
onomic knowledge. They argued that this is driven by an experiential increase in ecological knowl-
edge. It is conceivable that the structure of the causal relations underlying the ecologically related
categories in Coley and colleagues’ study (e.g., between tiger and parrot) was more complex, involving
indirect causal pathways and common causes rather than simple and direct cause–effect relations.
Thus, increased complexity may render non-taxonomic knowledge less available to reasoning pro-
cesses in younger children.
There may be a number of reasons why the younger children in our experiment relied on causal
knowledge rather than taxonomic knowledge when reasoning. The properties used required knowl-
edge about two quite distinctive biological domains: (a) food chain relations and disease contagion
and (b) taxonomic relations and genetics. One likely possibility is that knowledge of the genetic basis
of shared properties, inheritance, and biological processes is less elaborate in 5- and 8-year-olds com-
pared with 12-year-olds and adults (Au & Romo, 1999; Hatano & Inagaki, 1994; Hatano & Inagaki,
1997). Indeed, educational research suggests that children have conceptual gaps and erroneous con-
cepts in their explanations for genetics (Lewis & Kattmann, 2004; Smith & Williams, 2007) that be-
come more elaborate and accurate only with explicit instruction (Venville & Donovan, 2007). On
the other hand, the mechanism by which members of a common food chain may transmit diseases
is obvious and observable and constitutes a central part of the science curriculum for 8-year-olds.
In line with other work showing that children like to have an explanation for phenomena (Callanan
& Oakes, 1992), the children in our study may have preferred to base their reasoning on relations
for which they have a mechanistic explanation and a more coherent theory (Gutheil, Vera, & Keil,
1998). Children as young as 3 years have a basic appreciation that invisible agents can cause illness
(Kalish, 1996) and understand simple mechanisms by which contamination may come about (Siegal
& Share, 1990; Springer & Belk, 1994), suggesting that children do have some naive but systematic
theory about biological disease transmission.
One striking aspect of our results was that younger participants over-generalized their knowledge
of disease transmission mechanisms. A relevant example of knowledge over-generalization comes
from Keil and colleagues (1999), who showed that increases in knowledge about the mechanisms
of disease transmission simultaneously led to more accurate inductions for physical illness contagion
but less accurate reasoning about the causes of mental illness. Interestingly, the 8-year-old partici-
pants in Keil and colleagues’ study made the most inaccurate transmission choices. This over-gener-
alization parallels our current ﬁnding in which simple causal transmission is also seen as a basis for
sharing physiological properties such as cells. Thus, inaccurate beliefs or inappropriate causal expla-
nations seem to be supplanted only when children have more appropriate coherent explanatory sys-
tems at their disposal.
Because they show that causal knowledge dominates taxonomic knowledge in young reasoners,
our results are contrary to the claim made by proponents of the structured Bayesian approach that
taxonomic knowledge structures are the default (see Kemp & Tenenbaum, 2009; Tenenbaum, Kemp,
& Shafto, 2007). Nonetheless, theory-driven Bayesian approaches have the potential to explain
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Bayesian knowledge structures are minimalist and open to revision, both on encountering direct evi-
dence and through verbal instruction. These characteristics of the Bayesian account, in conjunction
with the observation that children are likely to have less well-developed domain-speciﬁc theories,
may allow the Bayesian approach to account for the divergence between 8-year-olds’ and adults’ pat-
terns of inductive selectivity. However, it aims to explain inference at a computational level rather
than in terms of process; the Bayesian approach does not address the issues of availability and pro-
cessing effort (Shafto, Coley, & Baldwin, 2007; Shafto, Coley, & Vitkin, 2007) that are likely to be impor-
tant when explaining developmental changes in reasoning ability.
Finally, our research made use of non-blank properties such as cells and diseases, with inductive
selectivity driven by the decrease in the use of causal relations when reasoning about cells. A future
interesting question will be to explore the developmental use of causal knowledge for inductive prob-
lems that use blank properties. It seems likely that changes in the application of causal knowledge
would be driven by cultural factors and expertise with causal choices likely to decrease in Western
and/or urban samples, whereas the use of causal knowledge is likely to persist in non-Western and
more rural samples (e.g., Coley, 2012; Lopez, Atran, Coley, Medin, & Smith, 1997). To summarize,
young children strongly prefer inductive arguments where there is a plausible causal mechanism
for property transmission, even where older children and adults appear to judge that mechanism irrel-
evant to the property to be generalized. Recruitment of this salient source of knowledge may be sup-
planted only by more contextually appropriate knowledge when formal education offers children an
alternative feasible mechanism by which two categories come to share properties. In addition, even 5-
year-olds are inﬂuenced by the directional nature of causal relations. All of this suggests that causal
relations are at least as important to young children’s reasoning as they are to adults’ reasoning
and that, in some respects, the manner in which causal reasoning inﬂuences reasoning is similar
across development.Acknowledgment
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Pretest similarity ratings for the 12 triads.
Causally related
category pair
Similarity rating for taxonomically related
categories in predictive condition
Similarity rating for taxonomically related
categories in diagnostic condition
Peanut–Monkey Peanut–Acorn (4.94)* Monkey–Zebra (4.56)*
Carrot–Horse Carrot–Onion (5.61)* Horse–Deer (5.78)*
Sandwich–Human Sandwich–Cake (5.28)* Human–Gorilla (5.72)*
Lettuce–Snail Lettuce–Potato (4.44)* Snail–Octopus (3.67)*
Apple –Caterpillar Apple–Lemon (5.17)* Caterpillar–Ant (5.06)*
Worm–Sparrow Worm–Dragonﬂy (4.06)* Sparrow–Chicken (3.89)*
Salmon–Bear Salmon–Ray (5.61)* Bear–Lion (5.06)*
Flower–Butterﬂy Flower–Tree (5.72)* Butterﬂy–Grasshopper (4.89)*
Cheese–Mouse Cheese–Cake (4.56)* Mouse–Rabbit (4.89)*
Acorn–Squirrel Acorn–Peanut (4.94)* Squirrel–Rat (4.56)*
Banana–Monkey Banana–Peach (5.44)* Monkey–Elephant (4.56)*
Carrot–Rabbit Carrot–Green pepper (4.44)* Rabbit–Sheep (4.33)*
* None of the similarity ratings was signiﬁcantly different.
Table A2
Pretest causal strength ratings for the 12 triads.
Causal strength rating for
causally related category pair
Causal strength rating for taxonomically
related category in predictive condition
Causal strength rating for taxonomically
related category in diagnostic condition
Peanut–Monkey (7.05) Peanut–Acorn (4.42) Monkey–Zebra (3.11)
Carrot–Horse (7.00) Carrot–Onion (4.05) Horse–Deer (4.11)
Sandwich–Human (7.89) Sandwich–Cake (4.37) Human–Gorilla (4.47)
Lettuce–Snail (7.37) Lettuce–Potato (3.05) Snail–Octopus (2.68)
Apple –Caterpillar (5.32) Apple–Lemon (3.79) Caterpillar–Ant (3.95)
Worm–Sparrow (7.89) Worm–Dragonﬂy (3.53) Sparrow–Chicken (3.79)
Salmon–Bear (6.37) Salmon–Ray (4.00) Bear–Lion (3.79)
Flower–Butterﬂy (6.58) Flower–Tree (4.40) Butterﬂy–Grasshopper (5.00)
Cheese–Mouse (7.74) Cheese–Cake (5.37) Mouse–Rabbit (4.00)
Acorn–Squirrel (7.42) Acorn–Peanut (4.42) Squirrel–Rat (4.16)
Banana–Monkey (7.53) Banana–Peach (3.84) Monkey–Elephant (4.00)
Carrot–Rabbit (7.95) Carrot–Green pepper (3.11) Rabbit–Sheep (4.21)
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